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The central questions in labor demand deal with the responsiveness of
employers’ use of various components of their inputs of labor to changes
in their costs. This general rubric includes employment-wage elasticities
for labor as a whole and for various labor subaggregates: elasticities of
relative employment in diﬀerent groups in response to changes in their rel-
ative costs; the patterns of employment change as scale expands and as
capital deepens or improves in quality; the paths of employment as old
equilibria are shocked and new ones are approached; and these same
things for measures of labor utilization, such as hours per time period.
All of these have been very extensively studied, and the existing literature
would seem to give a convincing degree of agreement on at least some of
the central issues (see Hamermesh 1993). Nonetheless, not everyone is con-
vinced about how much we really know on even the simplest question—the
constant-output own-price elasticity of demand for aggregate labor (Topel
1998). Because this parameter is fundamentally important for under-
standing the impacts of such diverse policies as payroll taxation, subsidies
for employment growth, and others, one wonders whether there is any
hope of convincing skeptics that something can be known. Part of the rea-
son for the skepticism may be the fact that most empirical research is based
on labor markets in industrialized countries. Such studies suﬀer from the
problem that exogenous changes in labor costs or restrictions on employ-
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I thank several anonymous referees for their comments.ment demand are very rare in those countries, and when they do occur they
are typically small. This means that researchers trying to identify struc-
tural parameters using these data must either rely on models that go to
great lengths to establish the exogeneity of the labor cost measures, or they
must search for tiny changes in employment and/or hours in response to
the few tiny exogenous changes in labor costs. Neither approach is partic-
ularly satisfying.
So long as one believes that the underlying technologies are the same in
developed and developing economies, data from the latter provide an ideal
way to infer the sizes of important structural parameters. Broad swings in
the political viewpoints of succeeding governments often lead to broad
changes in labor market policy in developing countries. The major vicissi-
tudes in policy can be exploited to allow inferences about these parameters
that are based on large exogenous changes in labor costs. It is true that in
many cases the data on labor markets in developing countries are not as
complete as in developed economies, but in some cases they are, and in
those instances the availability of good data that cover periods of wide-
spread and substantial policy changes allows us to make inferences about
labor demand that should be useful for students of labor market behavior
generally.
In some instances Latin America and the Caribbean meet both criteria:
Some of the policy changes are much larger, in terms of the size of the
shocks, than we typically see in developed economies, and in many cases
the data, especially establishment data, are very well suited to studying la-
bor demand. The majority of these studies do meet these criteria. In par-
ticular, the Saavedra and Torero (2000) study of Peru and the Barros and
Corseuil (2000) study of Brazil meet both of these criteria perfectly, while
the others all at least cover periods in which the shocks are much greater
than typically seen in industrialized economies. In what follows I examine
what we can learn about these central issues in labor demand from recent
studies of the economies of this region.
11.2 Evidence on the Overall Demand for Labor
The central parameter in the study of labor demand is the constant-
output own-wage elasticity of employment demand. Hundreds of esti-
mates of this parameter have been produced using a variety of methods
and types of data (Hamermesh 1993). A large number of the recent Latin
American and Caribbean studies generate estimates of this parameter.
Moreover, while most of the studies in the literature use aggregate or in-
dustry data, many of the studies in this recent group produce their esti-
mates using ﬁrm-level data, thus avoiding the aggregation biases that are
likely to be severe in what are surely nonlinear economic relationships. As-
suming measurement errors in these microdata are not a serious problem,
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in developing countries, the spatial disaggregation of the data gives these
studies an advantage over most earlier studies.
In table 11.1I summarize estimates of these elasticities from a number of
recent Latin American and Caribbean studies. The methodologies of the
studies are fairly closely comparable: All estimate equations describing the
logarithm of employment as a function of wages and output, thus provid-
ing a direct estimate of this crucial parameter. All except the Barbadian
study include at least one lag in employment as an additional regressor.
Clearly and necessarily the results diﬀer across the studies. In part, these
diﬀerences arise from slight variations in the methods of estimation and in
the data (their frequency, their level of spatial aggregation, and their deﬁ-
nitions of the measures of labor costs). These diﬀerences may also be due
to true diﬀerences in the nature of the technologies used in the diﬀerent
countries, perhaps diﬀerences in the output mix, perhaps true diﬀerences
in the available means of producing the same product.
Despite the obvious diﬀerences, the results are remarkable for their ap-
parent consistency. Taking the results for the four countries—Barbados,
Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay—for which the estimates have been produced
covering all employment, the average constant-output own-wage elasticity
is –0.30. The estimates by Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) are somewhat
larger than the other estimates, but one must remember that they are based
on employment disaggregated by a measure of skill, so it is unsurprising
that they are bigger (more in the following). There is clearly a range of esti-
mates presented here so that, as always with any group of empirical studies,
no one particular estimate can be inferred as being “the truth.” But taking
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Table 11.1 Latin American and Caribbean Estimates of Constant-Output Own-Wage Labor
Demand Elasticities
Estimated Elasticity
Frequency/Time Blue- White- 
Country/Study Data Period Collar All Collar
Barbados/Downes et al. Aggregate Annual/1970–96 –.17
Brazil/Paes de Barros  Establishments Monthly/1986–97 –.40
& Corseuil
Chile/Fajnzylber Firms Annual/1981–86 –.32 –.48
& Maloney
Colombia/Fajnzylber Firms Annual/1980–91 –1.37 –.59
& Maloney
Mexico/Fajnzylber Firms Annual/1986–90 –.42 –.44
& Maloney
Peru/Saavedra & Torero Sectors Quarterly/1987–97 –.19
Uruguay/Cassoni et al. 2-digit industries Quarterly/1975–84 –.69
Quarterly/1985–97 –.22all the estimated elasticities together, one must infer that they reinforce the
consensus estimate, –0.30, that I identiﬁed (Hamermesh 1993) from the
many studies covering mainly industrialized economies and based mainly
on more highly aggregated data. That we obtain a set of estimates whose
central tendency is around –0.30 is also consistent with the observation that
labor’s share of output is around 2/3 in a Cobb-Douglas two-factor world.
That the estimates replicate the previous literature should in part lay to
rest concerns that our knowledge of the size of this crucial parameter is too
uncertain to allow us to make predictions about the likely impact of im-
posed changes in labor costs on the level of employment. The sizes of the
shocks to labor costs in these countries, and their source in the sharp po-
litical changes that have swept over the region, suggest that concerns about
identiﬁcation that have led critics to question studies based on developed
economies should be less severe here. As in Angrist’s (1996) study of the
West Bank/Gaza Strip, these additional estimates for developing economies
suggest that our inferences from developed economies may be broadly ap-
plicable elsewhere.
Although estimates of the constant-output own-wage elasticity for ho-
mogeneous labor are the most common in the set of recent Latin American
and Caribbean studies, these studies contain a variety of other implica-
tions for the analysis of long-run labor demand that merit attention. The
Argentine study (Mondino and Montoya 2000) estimates the demand for
employment and hours separately, including as regressors lagged values of
each component of the labor input. The long-run wage elasticities gener-
ated in the study are thus measures of the responsiveness of the employ-
ment-hours ratio to changes in payroll costs (and are thus not included in
the tabulation of labor demand elasticities in table 11.1). The long-run con-
stant-output elasticity of employment to a change in labor costs, holding
hours constant, is –0.94. This implies a substantial degree of worker-hours
substitution and indicates that a rise in wages induces employers to work a
smaller labor force more intensely each hour. Because the same elasticity
based on the equation for hours is only –0.03, by inference a rise in labor
costs does not alter the length of the workweek.
Because it disaggregates employment by a broad measure of skill, the
three-country study by Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) allows us to exam-
ine whether there are diﬀerences by level of skill in the long-run respon-
siveness to shocks to labor demand. This depends on the nature of the
underlying possibilities for multifactor substitution among the types of la-
bor and capital, but past studies suggest that there is an inverse relation-
ship between the amount of skill embodied in a group of workers and the
absolute value of the elasticity of demand for their labor. Except for the es-
timates for Colombia, this is not the case in this study. This apparent in-
consistency with the literature may not be as disturbing as it seems at ﬁrst
glance, however. The level of skill in even the lower-skilled groups exam-
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white-collar groups summarized in table 11.1. Because the deﬁnition of
skill is so ﬂuid, the results here simply may not be comparable to those
found elsewhere in the literature.
In their estimates for the Caribbean, Downes, Mamingi, and Antoine
(2000) recognize that a well-enforced minimum wage that bites high into the
distribution of earnings will have major negative eﬀects on employment. In-
deed, even though their estimates are based on aggregate data and thus in-
clude many workers whose wage and employment are unlikely to be aﬀected
by changes in minimum wages, they ﬁnd this negative eﬀect for Jamaica,
where they specify a coverage-weighted minimum wage index (although not
for Trinidad and Tobago, where a less complex index is used). The exact
sizes of the estimated elasticities tell us nothing about the underlying struc-
ture of demand, because they depend on both the labor demand elasticity
and the fraction of the workforce aﬀected by the minimum, so I do not in-
clude them in table 11.1. Nonetheless, the results for Jamaica are consistent
with standard inferences about long-run labor demand elasticities.
While I do not summarize their impacts in table 11.1, most of the stud-
ies other than that by Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) include measures of
the costs of employment regulations in addition to the direct measure of la-
bor cost. Most specify these as representing the eﬀect of the changing strin-
gency of administrative regulations rather than the impact of endogenous
changes in the actual costs of the programs. Indeed, perhaps the strongest
point in some of these studies and their biggest innovation is the careful
construction of these measures in an area where the literature is fairly
sparse (Hamermesh 1993, chap. 8), and most studies simply look at before-
after changes. That in their study of Peru Saavedra and Torero ﬁnd signif-
icant reductions of employment in response to increases in the generosity
of severance pay suggests that, as with the wage-cost measures that are in-
cluded in standard labor demand equations, so too do other exogenous cost
increases reduce employment demand. Mondino and Montoya (2000),
who also carefully constructed a measure of the cost of employment regu-
lations, ﬁnd a similar result for Argentina.
Taken together, the Latin American evidence should add considerably to
economists’ and policy advisors’ assurance in emphasizing the long-run
economic costs of so-called job protection policies—their impacts on
average levels of employment. They should underline the essential irrele-
vance of a spate of mathematically clever theoretical models based essen-
tially on arguments about market imperfections that claim that such policies
may actually increase employment (e.g., Bertola 1992). They should also
make one very dubious about empirical results from cross-country compar-
isons that claim that such policies have no impact on employment levels,
based on examinations of the estimated impacts of quickly constructed in-
dexes of regulatory stringency in the labor market (e.g., OECD 1999).
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Most of the recent Latin American and Caribbean studies allow us to ex-
amine the path of employment as the labor market moves between old and
new equilibria in response to cost or output shocks. All of the studies spec-
ify smooth symmetric adjustment by including one or two lagged depend-
ent variables in the labor demand equations. Thus, while they ignore the in-
novations in the study of the dynamics of factor demand that were pointed
out in the 1990s (see Hamermesh and Pfann [1996] for a summary), their
ﬁrm rooting in the standard literature on factor demand allows for ready
comparisons.
Table 11.2 summarizes the speeds of adjustment of labor demand that
have been estimated in the recent Latin studies. In each case I have calcu-
lated the speed as the number of time periods, t∗, for half the gap between
old and new equilibria to be traversed. In these equations with a single
lagged dependent variable the calculation is







where   is the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable. To facilitate
comparisons across studies the table expresses t∗ in quarters. That there
may be temporal aggregation biases is well known and may explain why the
estimates here and in the literature generally indicate slower adjustment
the more highly temporally aggregated are the underlying data. Acknowl-
edging this, however, except for the Brazilian study by Barros and Corseuil
(2000), all of the estimated speeds of adjustment are slow relative to the
typical estimates for developed economies. In the literature, generally, the
best estimate is that the half-life of the lag in the adjustment of employment
demand is around two-quarters (Hamermesh 1993, chap. 7), below all but
the one exception listed in table 11.2.
We cannot determine whether the striking diﬀerence between these Latin
estimates and the estimates in the general literature arises because adjust-
ment is truly slower in Latin America, or because the dynamic speciﬁca-
tions of the estimating equations are incorrect. For example, it may be that
the assumption of smooth symmetric adjustment is incorrect, and any one
of a large variety of alternative speciﬁcations would describe the dynamics
in the data sets better. These would include lumpy adjustment, linear ad-
justment costs, and any kind of asymmetry. Perhaps the problem is espe-
cially severe in the context of a developing economy.
Findings in the literature for developed economies have also established
some regularities in the estimated relative speeds of adjustment of the de-
mand for diﬀerent components of the labor aggregate and for diﬀerent
groups of workers. Mondino and Montoya’s (2000) ﬁnding for Argentina
that the demand for hours adjusts more rapidly than the demand for em-
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economies and with the observation that adjusting hours initially in re-
sponse to what may be perceived as a temporary shock allows employers
to avoid incurring the ﬁxed costs of hiring and ﬁring workers.
A comparison of the relative speeds of adjustment of the demand for
blue- and white-collar employees in the Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) es-
timates is less encouraging. In estimates for two of the three countries that
they examine, adjustment is slower for blue- than for white-collar employ-
ees. This result is inconsistent with the widespread ﬁnding in developed
countries’ labor markets that adjustment speeds decrease with the skill of
the work group (presumably because the ﬁxed costs of hiring and ﬁring are
greater among more skilled workers). Why the results should be opposite
this is unclear. Perhaps unions and other institutional arrangements re-
strict the adjustment of blue-collar employment more than that of white-
collar employment; perhaps misspeciﬁcation of the dynamics due to the
temporal aggregation of the data is more serious in the equations describ-
ing blue-collar employment.
Beginning with Nadiri and Rosen (1969), a small literature has devel-
oped examining the linkages among the adjustment paths of several fac-
tors. The issue is whether greater speed in the adjustment of one produc-
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Country/Study Data Time Period Employment Hours Hours
Argentina/Mondino Firms Annual/1970–96 5.4 0.4
& Montoya




Data Time Period Collar All Collar
Chile/Fajnzylber Firms Annual/1981–86 8.8 4.0
& Maloney
Colombia/Fajnzylber Firms Annual/1980–91 20.8 5.6
& Maloney
Mexico/Fajnzylber Firms Annual/1986–90 14.4 19.2
& Maloney
Peru/Saavedra Establishments Quarterly/1987–97 5.1
& Torero
Uruguay/Cassoni et al. 2-digit industries Quarterly/1975–84 5.9
Quarterly/1985–97 5.0tive input raises the rate at which another adjusts—whether the inputs are
dynamic complements or not. There is no consensus in the literature on
this point for any pair of inputs, and the results in the one Latin study that
provides evidence on this issue do not help to pin down the answer to this
question. Mondino and Montoya (2000) do include lags in hours per
worker (employment) in the dynamic equations describing employment
(hours). Unfortunately, the coeﬃcients on lagged hours in the employment
equation sum to 0.15, while those on lagged employment in the equation
describing hours sum to –0.06. Perhaps the best conclusion is that there is
little evidence for or against the dynamic complementarity of employment
and hours per worker.
Increased product-market competition, such as would arise from greater
openness to international trade, might be expected to spur employers to
adjust more rapidly in response to shocks to costs or output. With com-
petitors from other countries introducing new products and technologies,
domestic producers become increasingly uncompetitive if they maintain
antiquated staﬃng structures. Evidence for Mexico based on monthly data
covering 1987–1995 (Robertson and Dutkowsky 2002) supports this hy-
pothesis. Cassoni, Allen, and Labadie (1999) provide some weak evidence
in favor of it too, because there was a slight rise in the speed of adjustment
of employment demand as the Uruguayan economy became more open.
One of the central purposes of the recent group of Latin American and
Caribbean studies was to examine how changing employment regulation,
particularly job security laws such as those governing severance pay,
aﬀected the speed of adjustment of employment demand. (Heckman and
Pagés [2000] discuss this at length.) The evidence on this issue in the litera-
ture (Hamermesh 1993, chap. 8) is sparse and conﬂicting. Much of it, like
Barros and Corseuil’s (2000) study for Brazil, is based on comparing
speeds of adjustment pre- and postregulatory change and is inconclusive.
Like the few other studies (e.g., Burgess and Dolado 1989) that actually try
to measure the severity of regulations, Saavedra and Torero (2000) ﬁnd in
their panel of establishments that increases in a carefully constructed mea-
sure of the cost of severance pay slow the speed of adjustment of employ-
ment. Their results suggest that, if we hope to uncover their dynamic
eﬀects, there is a large payoﬀ in empirical research on labor demand to
specifying the details of labor market regulations.
11.4 Conclusions and Implications
No single study of an economic phenomenon, or even several studies, is
ever highly convincing, because one can worry about the representative-
ness of the example and particular problems with the research design. The
results of recent Latin American and Caribbean studies, however, based as
they are on labor markets that have not been thoroughly examined using
560 Daniel S. Hamermeshmodern econometric techniques and that have been characterized by rel-
atively large shocks, should reinforce our conﬁdence about the negative
impact on employment of higher labor costs, both payroll costs and job
market regulations. They should remind policymakers that in developing
economies, as in developed ones, policies that may be socially desirable,
but that raise labor costs or increase labor market rigidity, have negative
consequences for the level of employment.
In many ways the strengths and weakness of these Latin American and
Caribbean studies mirror those of the vast literature of labor demand. The
estimates of static labor demand parameters seem generally reasonable—
reasonably tightly estimated and consistent with an underlying theory that
is fairly closely linked to the estimating equations. The estimates of the dy-
namics of adjustment are much less convincing, both in these studies and
in the larger literature. This may be because the dynamic speciﬁcations are
much less loosely linked to theory than are the static estimates. This diﬀer-
ence suggests that further work on Latin America and the Caribbean
should focus on more careful speciﬁcation of labor market dynamics if we
are to be able to draw inferences about the impact of shocks and labor mar-
ket regulations on ﬂuctuations in the demand for workers and hours.
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